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In their review of a monograph by A. N. Janushkevich, The Livonian War. 
Wilno against Moscow: 1558–1570.  (Moscow: Kvadriga; Russkaya Panorama, 
2013) the author points out that the monograph is a profound study, critically 
reviewing the preceding research of the military history of the 16th century. 
The review also analyzes the historical sources of the book as to their 
completeness and the degree of representativeness, looks into the arguments 
put forward by the author consecutively considering each chapter, and reveals 
the innovative conclusions, as well as comments on a number of doubtful 
statements made by the author. 
K e y w o r d s:  A. N. Yanushkevich; Livonian War; military history 
of the 16th century; Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; Stephen Báthory. 
В представленной рецензии на книгу А. Н. Янушкевича «Ливонская 
война. Вильно против Москвы: 1558–1570» (М. : Квадрига : Русская 
панорама, 2013) резюмируется, что книга производит впечатление 
серьезного нового исследования, критически суммирующего 
предыдущие наблюдения по военной истории XVI в. Анализируется 
полнота и репрезентативность исторических источников монографии, 
последовательно по главам приводятся аргументы автора, выявляются 
новаторские выводы и вместе с тем показывается сомнительность 
отдельных положений автора. 
К л ю ч е в ы е  с л о в а:  А. Н. Янушкевич; Ливонская война; военная 
история XVI в.; Речь Посполитая; Стефан Баторий.
A researcher of the Central European late Medieval and Early 
Modern war history has certain advantages as compared to the scholar 
of Medieval Russian war history. The former has access not only to compara-
tively detailed written accounts of wars, but also to much better preserved 
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collections of documents on the history of military organization, 
fiscal systems, and representative establishments. In this book, the author, 
A. N. Janushkevich, makes full use of these advantages.
To reconstruct the confrontation between Lithuania and the Rus-
sian state – a conflict of destiny-changing proportions for the former – 
the author draws upon an exhaustive number of archival and published 
sources. A. N. Janushkevich demonstrates a rather liberal attitude to Rus-
sian historiography; in particular, he convincingly takes A. L. Khoroshkevich 
to task for uncritically following A. A. Zimin. The latter, clearly, believed 
control of the principality of Staritsky to be the main aim of the oprichnina 
terror; he even linked a visit by the Tsar to the town of Staritsa in spring 
1563 to Ivan the Terrible’s struggle with the ‘Boyar opposition’ (p.  80). 
Janushkevich also disagrees with Khoroshkevich’s assessment of the Peace 
Treaty of June 1570, arguing that Russia had clearly won the confrontation, 
having retained a sizeable part of Livonia and Polotchina (p. 127).
In the first chapter Janushkevich analyzes the course of military 
operations and the diplomatic relations between Lithuania and Russia 
in the period between 1558 and 1570. He makes a significant contribution 
to the understanding of this already well-researched issue. Thus, his asser-
tion that the Russian government was poorly informed about the situa-
tion in the Baltic States in 1557 makes perfect sense. It is well known that 
in the late summer and early autumn of 1557, a war took place between 
Lithuania and the Livonian Order. It ended with the signing of the Poz-
volsk Treaty on 14th September 1557. According to the terms of the Treaty, 
Gotthard Kettler, a protégé of the Polish King Sigismund II Augustus, be-
came the Master of the Order. At the same time, the issue of the treaty 
signed with Lithuania was not even raised during Russia’s negotiations 
with the Order, and Janushkevich justly concludes that the Moscow diplo-
mats were ignorant of this important political event (p. 32).
The author is objective in his analysis of the reasons for Lithuania’s de-
feat, particularly, the loss of Polotsk. The weak capability for mobilization 
in Lithuania is well visible during the comparison of the tempo of the draft 
in the two armies: while the Russian army was mobilized over a short pe-
riod of time and by December 1562 had 31,000 warriors in its fighting units 
alone, by the end of December, the Lithuanian army, which began drafting 
on December 6th, numbered no more than 100 men (p. 70). Janushkevich 
justly acknowledges the uttermost importance of the Battle of Ula. 
Between this battle and the mid-17th century, Russia made no attempt 
to penetrate the territory of Rzeczpospolita and avoided all field conflict 
(p. 99). The author complements Russia’s significant investment in construc- 
ting castles on occupied Lithuanian territory – namely, the Ula castle where 
a large garrison with a huge amount of artillery was stationed (p. 118).
In the second chapter, the author concentrates on the organization 
of the military forces of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Janushkevich clearly 
shows that up until the Sejm of May 1563, the Lithuanian authorities were 
not capable of organizing effective resistance to Russia’s advance because 
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of the weakness and indiscipline that characterized the process of Rzecz-
pospolita mobilization (p. 138–139). However, the decisions of the conven-
tio generalis (the People’s Sejm) in May and June 1563 represent a successful 
attempt to adapt the archaic community of the Grand Duchy to the needs 
of a large-scale war. In particular, it was decided to provide one drab (infan-
tryman) for every 20 voloks (land divisions). Another noteworthy innova-
tion was a draft of artisans, putnye (administrative), boyars and peasants 
with carts and y-shaped bear spears, much like the draft of the pososhnaya 
militia in Russia (p. 142–143, 146). 
The first results of the work undertaken by the Grand Duke’s chan-
cellery and the Sejm were not impressive: according to the registry 
of 1565, Rzeczpospolita mobilization collected a mere 6594 horse warriors 
by October of that year. However, by the autumn of 1567, Rzeczpospolita 
mobilization had succeeded in assembling more than 27 thousand caval-
ry and infantry, a figure comparable to the strength of the Russian army 
during the Polotsk campaign, described above (p. 149–150, 161). An analysis 
of the structure of mercenary units in the Lithuanian army lead the author 
to a convincing conclusion about the difference between the Cossack 
fighters mentioned in the 16th century documents, and the later existing 
units of the actual Cossacks (p. 177).
The author provides data about the decision of the Gorodensky Sejm 
in 1566/67, according to which an additional levy for the draft of ten thou-
sand soldiers had been administered (p. 183–184). According to the author, 
the Poles lost the opportunity of drafting 3,500 mercenary soldiers who had 
previously taken part in two successful military campaigns: one the battle 
in Nevel in 1562, and another, a raid into the Pskov territory in March 1565 
(p. 202–205).
The sources upon which the second chapter of Janushkevich’s work 
is based, give an idea about the resources at the disposal of the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania. The third chapter, in turn, contains excellent material 
on the state finances, for which Russian historians have no comparative 
figures. The research masterfully shows the differences between the finan-
cial systems of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Russia. Lithuania’s skarb 
(the State Treasury) had been supplied by special taxes, destined for war 
(such as serebshchina and pogolovshchina), only by direct resolutions 
taken by the Sejms. For the collection of serebshchina from the masters’ 
estates, a direct ruling of the Great Duke was required (p. 217). Sometimes, 
as in 1568, the rate of serebshchina was raised by 60 % as compared to the pre-
vious year (p. 230). The estates of the Catholic and Orthodox clergy were also 
taxed and had to provide soldiers; moreover, the Polish gentry at the Sejms 
demanded the clergy be stripped of half of their churches’ possessions (p. 35).
The commoners, the Jews and the magnates were designated groups 
for funding the war. The first two groups were forced into making special 
loans (pozychki), similar to the ‘requested money’ (zaprosnye den’gi) used 
in 17th-century Russia. Similarly to the case with the ‘requested money’, 
the Lithuanian government promised to return pozychki from the tax 
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revenue, i.  e. to count them against future taxes. However, as the author 
shows, already in 1565 pozychka was not considered as a loan and was 
not supposed to be returned. One significant difference from the situation 
in the fiscal sphere in Russia, however, was the weakness of the state apparatus; 
in 1567 the Great Duke’s treasury consigned a guarantee for the repayment 
of the loan, but in the case of any shortfalls it threatened the cities by allowing 
mercenaries to collect the missing money independently (p. 236–237).
The Jewish communities of the Grand Duchy were in possession 
of sizeable financial resources, and therefore served as an inexhaustible 
source of revenue. The collection of pozychki from the Jews was successful 
due to the possibility of rapid mobilization: thus, in 1567 the special tax 
collected had to be transferred to the treasury a mere week after the issue 
of the taxation decree (p. 244).
A.  N. Janushkevich has successfully reconstructed the budget 
of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in 1561–1566. An abrupt diminishing 
in the treasury’s revenue between 1564 and 1566 demonstrates strains 
in the state economy of Lithuania and the powerlessness of its fiscal apparatus 
(p. 246–247). In these circumstances, the ruling elite of the Duchy levied itself 
with a part of the expenses needed for the maintenance of its mercenary army. 
The author provides impressive data on the expenses of the Orsha head F. Kmita, 
Field Hetman R. Sangushko, and voivode A.  Polubenskiy. These examples 
clearly show the vulnerability of the administrative and political systems 
of the Duchy, because the maintenance of the mercenary units was a sort of levy 
in exchange for feasible privileges: the magnates received the right of lifelong 
taxing of the towns and the voitovstvos (the boyars settlements) (p. 255, 273).
The fourth chapter of the book is dedicated to the study of the socio-
political changes in the state system of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania 
caused by war. The author correctly interprets the reasons for the issuing 
of the Vilno Privilege on 8th June 1563, when Christians of all confessions 
were granted equal rights. In his opinion, the main reason for the issue was 
the desire to consolidate the Orthodox gentry of the Eastern lands of the Grand 
Duchy in the event of the advance of the Russian armies under the banner 
of ‘protection’ of the Orthodox Church from the Catholics (p. 278–280).
Regarding the important question of the nature of the political 
struggle in the Sejms in the 1560s, the author supports the view 
of I.  I. Lappo, who, unlike M.  K.  Liubavskii, believed that between 
the magnates and the gentry of the Duchy there were no fundamental 
disagreements about union with Poland. The magnates supported 
the gentry in their quest to introduce the ‘nobility democracy’ by creating 
a common Polish-Lithuanian Sejm and preserving the local Sejms. 
At the same time, the author recognizes the special position occupied 
by the group of Radziwiłł magnates who favored the preservation 
of the sovereignty of Lithuania (p. 296, 307). Janushkevich rightly points 
to the formal nature of the ‘nobility democracy’, under the guise of which 
the magnates’ clientele was effectively functioning, and the young nobles 
moved to private service in the courts of those magnates (p. 304). 
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Describing the situation of the population in Northern Belorussia living 
on the frontline, the author outlines the common practice of survival when, 
regardless of religion or ethnic kinship, local residents supported the side 
that seemed the strongest at any given moment (p. 326–339).
The author’s conclusions, on the medieval character of the Rzeczpospolita 
military drafts, that eventually had to be replaced by the mercenary 
units, also prove valid (p. 341). The limited resources of the Great Duchy 
of Lithuania did not allow for the substitution of the military drafts 
by the mercenary army; it was only after the election of Stefan Batory 
as King of the united Rzeczpospolita that he managed to hire a significantly 
large military contingent in Germany and Hungary and to turn the tide 
of the war. A map of the military campaigns in Northern Belorussia, drawn 
by V. N. Temushev, deserves particular mention. All of the above proves 
the significant scientific value of the research conducted by Janushkevich.
On the other hand, not all of the interpretations and conclusions 
presented by the author are indisputable. For example, the author believes 
that taking possession of Polotsk did not bring Russia any tangible 
strategic advantage, because the Polotsk land formed a ‘wedge’ between 
Vitebsk and the Lithuanian possessions on the lower Dvina river (p. 64). 
However, one should keep in mind two things: first, that the 16th century 
maps did not render space adequately; and second, that the Russian 
command had planned to conquer Vitebsk after Polotsk – this was the aim 
of the 1564 winter campaign. The defeat of P. Shuiskiy’s army near 
Chashniki spelled the end of those plans; however, in the case of success, 
the takeover of Polotsk would have been undeniably justified. 
Chapter One, with all its richness, is mainly concentrated 
on the description of the war in Northern Belorussia, often ignoring 
the situation in the Baltic countries. For instance, the exceptionally 
important act of the stripping of Livonia of its inner political autonomy, 
and its inclusion into the Great Duchy of Lithuania, is mentioned only 
momentarily, in a fragment devoted to the Treaty of 1561 (p.  56). Yet, 
this fact calls for a different understanding of the creation of the Duchy 
of Magnus in Livonia by Ivan IV in 1570 – it was clearly intended to fill 
the resultant political vacuum. Similarly, it is difficult to accept 
the generally dismissive tone towards the enemy of Lithuania – the Russian 
state, repeatedly described as backward and barbaric. Firstly, in accordance 
with the traditions of Anglo-American, Polish and Lithuanian historiography 
that considers the Lithuanian-Russian state as Lithuania, Russia 
in the monograph is often referred to as ‘Muscovy’. Despite the fact that 
we have previously written about this inconsistency on several occasions, 
it is still necessary to repeat the point: if in the naming of the monarchical 
state one takes into consideration the titles of the monarch, then the country, 
led by ‘The Tsar, the Monarch and the Grand Duke of All the Russias’ should 
certainly be referred to as the Russian state, and not simply ‘Muscovy’. 
Secondly, the author does not include important and historiographically 
well-known facts concerning the reorganization of the state apparatus 
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and the military system of Russia in the 1550s. It was due to the reform 
of the so-called ‘Elected Rada’ that the reform of the cadastre system 
(soshnoe pis’mo) and the land reform were undertaken in Russia, resulting 
in the increase of tax revenues to the treasury; “Prigovor o kormleniyakh 
i sluzhbe” (‘The Tsar’s Decree on Maintenance and Service’, 1556), 
in turn, endorsed the increase in numbers and the re-equipping 
of the cavalry. These facts support Dunning’s contention that in the middle 
of the 16th century, the Russian State, along with the Kingdom of Castile, 
was one of the first fiscal-military states in Europe [Dunning].
Despite these reservations, this book by A.  N. Janushkevich should 
be recognized as a very important study, organically complementing, 
and in terms of its volume and the originality of its sources used even 
surpassing, Russian historians’ works, which are based mainly on Russian 
sources on the history of the Livonian War. 
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